Cases

Per Curiam. {¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because res judicata bars Johnson’s successive habeas corpus petition, we affirm. {¶ 2} In 1976, the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court convicted appellant, John A. Johnson, of aggravated murder with specifications, kidnapping, and rape. The common pleas court sentenced Johnson to death for the aggravate

Kane, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Canfield, J.), entered March 24, 2004 in Rensselaer County, which denied certain defendants’ motion to bifurcate the trial. A dump truck backed up and struck plaintiffs decedent, causing injuries which led to his death. When plaintiff’s action neared trial, defendants Hudson River Construction Company, Inc. and Albany Asphalt and Aggregates Corporation (herei

WYNN, Judge. Plaintiff-passenger, Thomas Jeffrey Johnson, rode in a car owned and operated by the third-party defendant-appellant, Teddy Shane Zimmerman, when defendant, Daniel Richard Hudson, collided into the rear of the Zimmerman car. Mr. Johnson sued Mr. Hudson and the owner of the truck, Jason Lamar Hudson (hereinafter “defendants”) alleging that he suffered bodily injury as a result of defendants’ negligence.

OPINION OF THE COURT James B. Canfield, J. Defendants Hudson River Construction Co., Inc., Albany Asphalt & Aggregates Corp. (AAAC), and Robert C. Higley, individually and doing business as Bob Higley Trucking, move and cross-move for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff Carlynann V. Johnson, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Warren D. Johnson’s cause of action for losses suff

Johnson v Hudson Riv. Constr. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 24048) Johnson v Hudson Riv. Constr. Co. 2004 NY Slip Op 24048 [3 Misc 3d 347] February 25, 2004 Supreme Court, Rensselaer County, Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant t

OPINION *Page 2 {¶ 1} Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus claiming he is being unlawfully held due to the failure of the Supreme Court to render a judgment entry which comported with the requirement's of Crim.R. 32(C), when his death sentence was converted to a life sentence.1 {¶ 2}

The dual issues brought before this Court on appeal involve a lease and whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting the testimony of certain witnesses regarding statements made by the deceased concerning the lease and whether the trial court's construction of a renewal provision contained in the lease was proper. On January 31, 1952, Milford Johnson and wife, Mae Johnson, as lessors, entered into a long term lease with J.E. Hudson, R.G. Heath, F.M. Heath, Ma

NEARN, Judge. Plaintiff Johnson sued defendant Hudson for a real estate commission allegedly due under an oral agency contract. Hudson denied that any commission was due or that any oral contract to pay such commission existed. The Chancellor entered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $10,080.00 and the defendant has appealed. The only real issue is whether under the facts plaintiff is entitled t

Certiorari denied. 305 So.2d 834. ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, OVERTON and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge: Prisoner O’Neill Hudson (“Hudson”) appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. Hudson alleges that he remains unconstitutionally incarcerated because the prison disciplinary board, without any evidence, found him guilty of committing a riot and thus revoked his accrued good-time credits. We affirm. Hudson, an inmate at the Unit of the

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA GERRARD D. JONES, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED v. CASE NO. 1D15-2377 ANTONIO M. HUDSON; TORREY M. JOHNSON; ETC., STATE OF FLORIDA, ET AL., Appellees.

JOHNSON, J. Defendant/Appellant, Terrance P. Hudson a/k/a "Pepper," appeals his sentences for manslaughter, attempted second degree murder, and intimidation of a witness from the 24th Judicial District Court, Division "O". For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant's convictions and sentences on counts one and two, vacate Defendant's sentence on count three, and remand the matter for resentencing consistent with this

OPINION HERVEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, COCHRAN, and ALCALA, JJ., joined. A jury convicted Appellant of capital murder and assessed her punishment at life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Her conviction was affirmed by the Sixth Court of Appeals after remand from this

KELLER, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which PRICE, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY, COCHRAN, and ALCALÁ, JJ., joined. In the court of appeals, appellant complained that the trial judge erred in failing to submit to the jury a lesser-included offense. In sustaining that complaint, the court of appeals conducted its error a

MEMORANDUM ALETA A. TRAUGER, United States District Judge Before the court is the Motion to Compel Arbitration- and to Stay All Proceedings (Doc. No. 12) filed by defendant BAH Shoney’s Corp.1 (“BAH” or “defendant”). Plaintiff Tamika Hudson has filed a Response opposing the motion (Doc. No. 22), along with a supporting Memorandum (Doc. No. 23) and Corrected Affidavit (Doc. No.

393 S.C. 1 (2010) 709 S.E.2d 65 Frances S. HUDSON, Deceased Employee, by Kenneth L. Hudson and Keith B. Hudson, Co-Executors of her Estate, as well as Matthew Deese and/or Andrew Deese, Respondents, v. LANCASTER CONVALESCENT CENTER, Employer, and Legion Insurance Company, In Liquidation through the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, Carrier, Appellants. No. 4705.

528 N.W.2d 260 (1995) DAYTON HUDSON CORPORATION, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Artie JOHNSON, Respondent. No. C1-94-1961. Court of Appeals of Minnesota. February 28, 1995. *261 Brian A. Wood, Michael J. McGuire, Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel, Minneapolis, for appellant. Artie Johnson, pro se. Considered and decided

Sanders, J. ¶40 (dissenting) — RCW 7.06.060(1) and MAR 7.3 recognize a party can withdraw its request for a trial de novo, and nothing in chapter 7.06 RCW or MAR 7 places any limitation on when a party can do so — nor is such a limitation necessary for the provisions to function. This court should hold, as the Court of Appeals held, that Clifford Hapner is entitled to withdraw his trial request. See Hudson v. Hapner, 146 W

687 S.E.2d 163 (2009) HUDSON v. EASTERLING. No. A09A2396. Court of Appeals of Georgia. November 19, 2009. *164 Christopher T. Adams, Lawrenceville, for Appellant. Hope Easterling, pro se. MIKELL, Judge. Wesley Hudson appeals from the trial court's order granting the petition for modification of their divorce

669 S.E.2d 94 (2008) HUDSON v. The STATE. No. S08A1396. Supreme Court of Georgia. November 3, 2008. *96 Marion A. Clark II, Christopher G. Paul, Cartersville, for appellant. T. Joseph Campbell, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Christopher R. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee.