Cases

GRIFFIS, P.J., for the Court: ¶ 1. This appeal considers whether the circuit court correctly granted a summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. We find reversible error and remand for further proceedings. FACTS ¶2. Mary Cory Gallagher owned land in Amite County, Mississippi. Veronica F. Carb

CARLTON, J., for the Court: ¶ 1. Janelle Pritchard, the Robert A. Pritchard Marital Trust (“Marital Trust”), and Hickory Street LLC (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed suit against Wells Fargo Advisors LLC (“Wells Fargo”), as the successor in interest of Wachovia Securities and A.G. Edwards Inc. and Jon Reynolds, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. Plaintiffs alleged that Wells Fargo and one of its financi

MAXWELL, J., for the Court: ¶ 1. This ease involves damages imposed against Gary Lamar Smiley and his wife, Mary Ann Smiley, for the wrongful removal of timber from property the chancellor found they held in trust for the plaintiffs’/appellees’ benefit. While Mississippi law requires clear and convincing evidence to establish the existence of a trust, here, we are uncertain whether the chancellor employed

Chambers, J.* ¶1 For nonagricultural land, Washington’s deed of trust act provides a comparatively inexpensive and fast mechanism for the lending industry to foreclose on property pledged as security for a debt through a nonjudicial foreclosure action. In a nonjudicial foreclosure, a properly appointed trustee is empowered by the act to hold a foreclosure sale without judicial supervision. However, th

FILE, IN CLERK8 OF,.CE IUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHNmlH FEB 2 B 2013 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STEVEN F. SCHROEDER, ) ) Petitioner, ) No. 86433-1 ) (consolidated with No. 86710-1) v. )

1 Reported in 171 P.2d 189. This is an action to condemn a private way of necessity for logging road purposes over and across lands of the relators under the provisions of Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), §§ 936-1, 936-2, and 936-3. On March 25, 1946, after a hearing on the petition, the court entered an order of necessity holding that petitioners had the right to condemn a pri

Nichols, Judge, dissenting: I regret that I feel compelled to dissent in this case, though perhaps not as keenly as if my views commanded majority support, leading to a new trial and further delay in righting the ancient wrongs done the ancestors of these Indians. My minority position, happily, exempts me from feeling any moral scruples against saying what I think. Then too, I am not certain the errors