Cases

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 42 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 43 OPINION The Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund for Northern California (Trust Fund)

82 B.R. 402 (1988) In re Robert F. TOTTEN, a/k/a/d/b/a R.T. Auto Body, Debtor. Mary REITMEYER, Trustee, Plaintiff, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; Noah T. Totten, Defendants. Bankruptcy No. 87-1956, Adv. No. 87-370. United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania. February 10, 1988. *403 Craig R. McKay, Asst. U.S. Atty., Pitts

GARLAND, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The False Claims Act, “adopted in 1863 and signed into law by President Abraham Lincoln in order to combat rampant fraud in Civil War defense contracts,” S.Rep. No. 99-345, at 8 (1986), is the “Government’s primary litigative tool for combating fraud,” id. at 2. Today, the court adopts an interpretation that, the government warns, leaves “vast sums of federal monies” wi

370 F.Supp.2d 18 (2005) UNITED STATES of America ex rel., ERVIN AND ASSOCIATES, INC., Plaintiff, v. THE HAMILTON SECURITIES GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants. No. CIV.A.96-CV-1258 LFO, No. CIV.A.99-CV-1698-LFO. United States District Court, District of Columbia. January 25, 2005. *19 *20

96 B.R. 275 (1989) In re SIERRA STEEL, INC., Debtor. SIERRA STEEL, INC., Appellant, v. TOTTEN TUBES, INC., Appellee. BAP No. NV-88-1005-PMoR, Bankruptcy No. 84-00359, Adv. No. 86-0071. United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted October 20, 1988. Decided February 6, 1989. *276

218 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) In re KAYPRO, Debtor.ARROW ELECTRONICS, INC., Appellant,v.HOWARD JUSTUS, Trustee, Appellee.In re KAYPRO, Debtor.ARROW ELECTRONICS, INC., successor-in-interest to SCHWEBER ELECTRONICS, INC., Appellant,v.HOWARD JUSTUS, Trustee, Appellee. No. 99-55206, No. 99-55210 Office of the Circuit Executive U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 2024 WY 5 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023 January 12, 2024 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF NEAL E. TOKOWITZ a/k/a NEAL EDWARD TOKOWITZ, deceased: JAMES SILVERWOOD, Personal Representative of the Estate of Neal E. Tokowitz and RANDY GREEN, Trustee of the residual trust established for Ca

Mr. Justice Carter delivered the opinion of the court: Appellants filed a bill in the circuit' court of Cook county in July, 1917, against their brother, Howe Totten, and others, for a partition of certain real estate in the village of Winnetka, in said county. Harry Totten and his sister, Melissa Susan Totten, filed an answer, and Harry Totten filed a cross-bill claiming certain

PER CURIAM. This is the third appeal in the same litigation, which involves a mortgage on an' apartment building in Washington City. The first1 was from the substitution of trustees by the court below; the second,3 from a decree appointing, a receiver of the property. On each appeal we affirmed. The facts to the date of the second appeal are fully sta

PER CURIAM. In this appeal appellants ask to have set aside a substitution of trustees under a deed of trust executed in October, 1929. Four hundred and ninety notes aggregating $385,000 were made and delivered on the security of the property conveyed in the trust. The original trustees were Luther A. Swartzell and Edmund D. Rheem. Good cause existed why they should be removed and new trustees substituted, and in February, 1

GRONER, J. Oaklawn Terrace is an apartment building in Washington City. In 1929 the owner, David L. Stern, and his wife mortgaged the property for $385,000. The debt was payable in three years, and the deed of trust contained the usual provisions for sale in the event of default in principal, interest, or taxes. In 1930 Howe Totten, one of appellants, purchased the property subject to the deed of trust, and executed a second

Bronson, J. This is an original application to this court to compel the board of administration and the educational commission to refrain from preparing and prescribing the courses of study for the common schools of the state. The respondents filed a return setting up that the board of administration possessed the authority so to prepare courses of study pursuant to, the provisions of Senate Bill No. 134, enacted by the legislat

Dent, Judge: E. E. Cook filed Ms bill in chancery against H. P. Totten in the circuit court of McDowell County setting forth that at the instance of the defendant he had purchased two certain lots Nos. 72 and 73 on the map of the town of Kimball as laid off and platted by the defendant, on one of which he had erected a valuable dwelling house for his own use, that to enjoy such property it was necessary that certain streets as

PER CURIAM. Prior to bankruptcy the Southern Iron Company came into possession of a certain steam shovel under the following agreement: “Cincinnati, Ohio, April 20, 1896. “Southern Iron Company, Oartersville, Ga. — Gentlemen: I hereby agree to rent to you Little Giant Steam Shovel No. 472, now on route to Oartersville, Ga., at $100 per month, payable on the 1st d

Civil action in the nature of a summary proceeding in ejectment. On 28 August, 1926, the defendant and his wife, being indebted to the Prudential Insurance Company of America in the sum of $11,000 for money borrowed, executed a deed of trust on a house and lot in the city of Durham to secure payment of same according to its tenor. The Raleigh Real Estate and Trust Company was named trustee in said deed of trust, and the following stipulation appears therein: "The said parties of

The Vice-Chancellor : The lot in question, No. 214, was one of the lots which, in the division of the estate of Nicholas William Stuyvesant, fell to the share of Peter Stuyvesant, one 0f })jg SOns, and which the latter mortgaged to the complainant. In the case of Stuyvesant v. Root, before the Chancellor (and in error, 18 Wend. 257,) involving the question of title to another lot in the sa

Rockwell, Justice. This demurrer is far from being frivolous. Before the Code, it was not necessary that an action upon a promissory note, payable to bearer, or endorsed in blank, should be prosecuted in the name of the owner, or real party in interest. Where the note was endorsed in blank, the owner had a right to fill up the endorsement with any name he pleased, and the person whose name was so inserted would be deemed on the re

OPINION OF THE COURT ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. We have granted leave pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to appeal an interlocutory order of the district court. The sole question for decision is whether the holding of the district court determining that fire insurance payments are “proceeds” as that term is defined in § 9-306 of the Uniform Commerical Code, a

As the reversal of the Special Term was upon the law, and not upon the facts, we are to inquire whether under the most favorable view of the evidence upon which the Special Term based its judgment, it can be supported. Our conclusion is that the reversal was error, evidently due to the fact that the appellate tribunal did not so thoroughly appreciate, as did the Special Term, some portions of the evidence. The former court treated the case as if the *Page 284

The first question presented relates to our jurisdiction to hear the appeal. As the reversal was upon the facts as well as the law, if there was a material question of fact we cannot consider the action of the Appellate Division in determining it, for we are confined by the Constitution to the review of questions of law. (Matter of Thorne, 162 N.Y. 238.) The court below exercised its appellate jurisdiction by reversing the decree of the surrogate an