Cases

OPINION WIDENER, Circuit Judge: Zuberi Hondo pleaded guilty to two counts of illegally possessing a firearm and one count of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. Finding that Hondo had two prior qualifying convictions, the district court sentenced him to 170 months as a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, Hondo argues that the district court

MOORMAN, Judge: The appellant, veteran Zuri Zuberi, previously appealed, through counsel, a January 16, 2004, decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) that, inter alia, denied entitlement to VA service connection for hepatitis A. Prior to briefing, the parties filed a joint motion for remand, which was granted by an order of the Clerk on May 3, 2005. Currently pending be

Opinion ESPINOSA, J. The petitioner, Muhoza Zuberi, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court committed plain error1 by refusing to grant his amended petition when the court failed to apply a clearly applicable statute, General Statutes § 54-lj,

PER CURIAM. We reverse the denial of the defendant’s Motion for Enforcement of Final Judgment on Motion for Post-Conviction Relief. First, unlike the trial court, we do not view the defendant’s motion as a successive 3.850 motion. The defendant is merely seeking to enforce a prior trial court order which granted the defendant an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, we find that the

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  Plaintiff-Appellee, v.  No. 03-4241 ZUBERI MUATA HONDO, a/k/a Kevin Parker, Defendant-Appellant.  Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg.

MOORMAN, Judge, dissenting: It is a peculiar logic that results in the issuance of a majority opinion on behalf of “the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims” and then, in effect, declares that our decisions are no longer controlling on the Secretary or the Board. Such muddled thinking would render us nothing more than an advisory body with no authority to bind either VA or the Board. In the eyes of

LANCE, Judge, dissenting: With due respect for my colleagues, as I would hold that the appellant is a prevailing party, I must dissent. To be a prevailing party, and to be brought across the threshold so as to be entitled to “reasonable” attorney fees and expenses, the appellant need only prevail “on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MARGARET BOZGOZ, et al., Plaintiffs, No. 19-cv-2790 (RDM) v. FRED HAYNES, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This case came before the Court after Plaintiffs, who are proceeding pro se, filed their Fourth Amended Complain

720 F.Supp.2d 19 (2010) Antoine MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 09-1241 (EGS). United States District Court, District of Columbia. July 1, 2010. *20 Iris McCollum Green, Green & Foushee, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff. Zuberi Bakari Williams, Patricia Ann Jones, Office of

601 F.Supp.2d 324 (2009) John BARNHARDT, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 08-1327 (JDB). United States District Court, District of Columbia. March 11, 2009. *326 John Barnhardt, Washington, DC, pro se. Paul D. Hunt, Rockville, MD, for Plaintiff. Zuberi Bakari Williams, Office

LANCE, Judge, concurring: While I agree that the EAJA application must be denied in this case, I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis. This opinion perpetuates the fallacy that the Court can remand cases without any apparent basis for exercising its authority. See Vahey v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 208, 214 (2006) (Lance, J., dissenting) (arguing it was inappropriate to deny the appellant prevai

686 F.Supp.2d 95 (2010) Essica BARNABAS, Plaintiff, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the UNIVERSITY OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant. Civil Action No. 07-02207 (JDB). United States District Court, District of Columbia. March 1, 2010. *98 David Raphael Levinson, Levinson Law Office, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff. Heather R

THIS VERSION OF THE OPINION REFLECTS THE SEPTEMBER 10, 2013, ERRATA UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS NO. 12-548(E) MICHAEL J. GARSOW, APPELLANT, V. ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE. On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' App

DiPENTIMA, C.J. *752 The petitioner, Rolando Robles, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the habeas court improperly denied his petition because his guilty pleas, made pursuant to the

Opinion PELLEGRINO, J. This appeal arises from a summary process action based on lapse of time of a written commercial lease between the plaintiff landlord, FlrstLight Hydro Generating Company, and the defendant tenant, First Black Ink, LLC. The defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding immediate possession of the subject premises to the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant clai

605 F.Supp.2d 89 (2009) Shirley TABB, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA and Brenda Donald Walker, Defendants. Civil Action No. 06-0789 (PLF). United States District Court, District of Columbia. March 19, 2009. *91 Richard E. Condit, Government Accountability Project, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff. Michael P. Bruckheim, Sa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MARGARET BOZGOZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 19-2790 (RDM) DARRYL GLEN BLACKWELL, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 38, the supplemental complaint f

KASOLD, Chief Judge: Veteran Angel Vazquez-Flores applies through counsel pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), for an award of attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $29,560.92 for 179.4 hours of attorney work and $865.40 in expenses. The Secretary challenges Mr. Vazquez-Flores’s EAJA application in part asserting substantial justification an

On Appellant’s Application for Attorney Fees and Expenses KASOLD, Judge: Pending before the Court is veteran Randolph S. Gurley’s October 28, 2005, application for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), in the amount of $6,429.72. The Secretary filed a response in which he argues that the EAJA a

MEMORANDUM OPINION JOHN M. FACCIOLA, United States Magistrate Judge. This case has been referred to me for resolution of discovery disputes. Five discovery motions are currently pending: 1) Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Respond to Discovery Requests [# 34] (“Mot. to Sanction”), 2) Motion for Protective Order Precluding its